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Casualty and Theft Losses
By CATHRINE EDMONDSON, Attorney
Washington, D.C.

Since casualty and theft losses are of a
serious and unpredictable nature, the principal
reason for allowance of deductions therefor is
to mitigate the effects of such losses. Because
the deduction provisions afford protection in
unfortunate situations, they have been char
acterized as serving the function of insurance
or as a substitute for or supplement to insur
ance.1
In general, in order for casualty losses to
be deductible, under section 165 of the Code,
they must be evidenced by closed transactions,
fixed by identifiable events, bona fide, and
actually sustained during the taxable period
for which allowed.2 This applies to a loss
arising from theft except that such a loss is
allowable only for the taxable year in which
the taxpayer discovers such loss.3 Ordinarily,
to be deductible, losses of these types must
be of characters which permit definite ascer
tainment and measurement in money terms.4*
It is well established that the burden of
proving a casualty or theft loss and the amount
thereof is upon the taxpayer.3 This may be
said to be a corollary to the statements re
peatedly made by the courts that the deduc
tion of losses is a privilege and not a right,
and that deductions are a matter of legisla
tive grace.6
One illustration of the failure of a taxpayer
to carry the burden of proof was the Mc
Morran case, decided in 1939 by the Board
of Tax Appeals.7 In that case it was held the
loss arising from the death of a riding horse
which occurred soon after the horse had swal
lowed a silk hat lining was not deductible be
cause of failure to prove that death was due
to this act, rather than to an illness.
Appraisals are of particular importance to
a taxpayer in ascertaining and proving the
decrease in value of property by reason of a
casualty, and preferably should be made by
one or more experienced and reliable ap
praisers. This may be illustrated by the 1958
Tax Court decision in the Tank case,8 holding
1 See statements of Prof. Melvin I. White, Brooklyn
College, to Subcom. on Fed. Tax Policy, Joint Com
mittee Rept., 11/9/55, pps. 362, 363 and 366.
2 Sec. 2S.15, Mer‘ens Law of Federal Taxation.
3Sec. 165(e), IRC 1954.
4 Sec. 28.50 of Mertens, supra.
5Burnet v. Houston, 5 S. Ct. 413 (1931); Rev. Rul.
57-524, C.B. 1957-1, 141.
6Sec. 28.01, Mertens, supra.
7 B.T.A. Memo. Opp. (1939) Dec. 10,628-E.
8 29 T.C. No. 77 (1958).

that a casualty loss was not deductible for
damage to a new residence allegedly due to
the vertical slippage of a river bank. In that
case the taxpayer did not have an independent
expert investigation made by a disinterested
party to prove the facts. Instead, he relied
primarily on the opinion of his architect that
cracks in the ceilings and walls of the resi
dence were the result of an unusual cause and
not faulty construction. The Court emphasized
that the taxpayer did not prove the proximate
cause of the damage or that he sustained a
loss. Where a taxpayer sustains a deductible
casualty loss, the appraisal fees paid to estab
lish such loss apparently are deductible under
section 212(3) of the 1954 Code as expenses
incurred in determining tax liability.9
One difficult problem throughout the years
has been the interpretation as to what is meant
by the words “other casualty,” following the
words fire, storm and shipwreck. For many
years it was thought that such a deductible
loss must be due to natural causes. However,
court decisions and Revenue Service rulings
have developed the present overall concept
that the term “other casualty” refers to an
identifiable event of a sudden, unexpected, or
unusual nature, and that damage or loss result
ing from progressive deterioration of property
through a steadily operating cause does not
constitute a casualty loss. Application of the
overall concepts and limitations are well illus
trated by Revenue Ruling 69, published in
1953, relating to losses sustained by indi
viduals owning property on the Great Lakes,
and making distinctions between losses directly
resulting from a storm and other losses.10
The 1927 decision in the case of Shearer
v. Anderson” may be said to have been of
particular significance in the development of
the present concept of a casualty loss, par
ticularly with respect to losses resulting from
automobile accidents. In that case, damage
due to an accident attributable to the icy con
dition of a roadway and to the subsequent
freezing of the motor was held deductible as
a casualty loss. In so holding the court com
pared the automobile with a yacht, and an
automobile accident with a shipwreck, and it
seems first established the principle that a
9 Rev. Rul. 58-180, C. B. 1958-1, 154.
10 C.B. 1953-1, 41.
11CCA-2, 16 Fed. (2d) 995 (Acq.); G.C.M. 1802 and I.T.
2363, C.B. VI-1, p. 219.
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deductible casualty loss does not have to re
sult from natural physical forces.
Under the present concept, damage to an
individual’s automobile by collision or acci
dent usually is deductible if due merely to
faulty driving of the taxpayer or other per
son, but is not considered deductible if due
to willful act or willful negligence of such a
driver. Drunken driving, for example, is a
case of willful negligence.12 However, the
allowable deduction does not extend to ex
penses in taking care of personal injuries, a
payment in settlement of a personal injury
claim resulting from an automobile accident,
or to an amount paid because of liability for
damage to another person’s property.13
Another difficulty in the casualty loss area
relates to such losses resulting from termite
damages. The Service’s position, as announced
on March 13, 1959, is that it will follow cer
tain court decisions14 allowing deductions in
cases where the infestation and subsequent
damage were proved to have occurred in rela
tively short periods of time. However, in other
cases where the termite infestation and dam
ages occur over longer periods of time the
Service will continue to follow other court
decisions.15
With respect to the theft loss deduction pro
vision a principal point is that such a loss re
sults from the unlawful taking and removing
of money or other property with the intent of
depriving the owner of the property. This
principle was involved in the Bonney case,
holding that a claimed theft loss deduction for
spending money and clothing which a taxpayer
gave to his wife over a period of years before
annulment of their marriage was not deduc
tible, in the absence of proof of a criminal
intent to deprive and defraud him of the
property.16

SELLS GOLD MEDAL WINNERS

For the first time in the history of the Elijah Sells
award, the winner of a gold medal was a woman. Step
ping on the toes of tradition, Mrs. Ellin McClarin
Melohn of Mobile, Alabama, received the highest grades
in the Uniform Examination for Certified Public Account
ants at the May examination. She is shown above
accepting the award from Mr. Richa:d H. Grosse, Chair
man of the AICPA Board of Examiners. Mrs. Melohn is
a senior accountant with Robert L. Godwin Associates
in Mobile. Recipient of the same award for the Novem
ber 1958 examination is Mr. Lee N. Abrams (right) of
Chicago, Illinois, an attorney with Mayer, Friedlich,
Spiess, Tierney, Brown & Platt of that city.

12 IRS Pub. No. 155.
13 IRS Pub. No. 155; sec. 28.58, Mertens, supra, Mulhol
land, 16 B.T.A. 1331; Peyton, 10, B.T.A. 1129.
14TIR-142: Buist v. U.S., 164 Fed. Supp. 218; Rosen
berg v. Commissioner, 198 Fed. (2d) 46; and Shop
maker et al v. U.S., 119 Fed. Supp. 705.
15TIR-142; U.S. v. Betty Rogers et al., 120 Fed. (2d)
253; Fay et al v. Helvering, 120 Fed. (2d) 253; and
Dodge et ux v. Commissioner, 25 TC 1022.
16Bonney v. Commissioner, 247 Fed. (2d) 237, cert. den.
355 U.S. 906.
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Embezzlement losses are classified as theft
losses.17 This classification is in accord with a
decision of the Tax Court holding that a tax
payer was entitled to a deduction where a
contractor absconded with part of the down
payment which the taxpayer had made on the
construction of a personal residence.18
However, the mere disappearance of money,
jewelry, or other property, whether mislaid
or lost, or the mere suspicion of theft may not
be the subject of a theft deduction.19 Mis
representation by a real estate broker or
vendor also does not result in a deductible
theft loss.20
17 IRS Pub.
18 Miller, 19
19 Bakewell,
20 IRS Pub.

No.
TC
Jr.,
No.

155.
1046 (Acq.)
23 TC 803.
115; Springer, T.C.M. 1957-232.

